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In the state of Tennessee, juvenile offenders convicted as adults for first-degree murder 
must receive a minimum sentence of 51 years in prison before becoming eligible for parole. 
Tennessee’s minimum juvenile sentencing guideline is the strictest in the United States. In 2012, 
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that sentencing juvenile offenders to life is 
unconstitutional citing psychological evidence for a juvenile’s ability to be rehabilitated in 
comparison to adults (Miller v. Alabama, 2012). Tennessee’s 51-year minimum juvenile 
sentencing standard is a potential violation of this ruling because it has been shown that the life 
expectancy in prison is unlikely to reach more than fifty years (Patterson, 2013; Wildeman, 
2016). Furthermore, Tennessee’s minimum sentencing guideline for juvenile homicide offenders 
appears to disregard psychological evidence that indicates that juvenile offenders should not be 
treated the same as adults (e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012; Cohen & Casey, 2013; Mulvey & 
Schubert, 2012; Scott, Grisso, Levick, & Steinberg, 2015). In this policy analysis, the inadequacy 
of the current minimum sentencing standard is evaluated, and it is argued as to why this 
sentencing standard should be substantially lowered. The central thesis of the analysis utilizes 
empirical evidence gathered from the psychological and legal literatures to support why 
Tennessee’s current policy disregards scientific research. Ultimately, this evidence is used to 
support the idea that Tennessee’s minimum sentencing law for juveniles is inappropriate and to 









Adolescent- someone 12 to 18 years old in the transitional phase from childhood to adulthood  
Adult prison system- penitentiary or detention center that houses adult offenders (different from a 
juvenile detention center which typically houses offenders below the age of 21)  
Cognitive behavioral therapy- therapy in which thought patterns and internalized norms are 
challenged in order to alter negative behavior patterns 
Cortical development- the growth and maturation of the lobes in the brain  
Culpability- responsibility for a fault or action; guilt 
Frontal lobe- structure in the brain responsible for higher functions and logical reasoning  
Future orientation- an individual’s capacity to accurately think about the future, consider 
consequences for actions, and planning actions  
Groupthink- acting or thinking as a group in ways that discourage individual responsibility  
Identity formation- process of developing a personality and values system in a particular stage of 
life (usually adolescence)  
Juvenile- a person below the age of 18 and above the age of 12  
Juvenile offender- a person below the age of 18 and above the age of 12 who has committed a 
crime 
Mandatory minimum sentencing- binding guidelines that judges must follow when sentencing an 
offender for specific crimes (the lowest punishment that can be received for the crime) 
Mitigation/Mitigating- the action of reducing the severity or seriousness of something 
Mitigated culpability- a lessening of responsibility for an action or crime due to circumstances 
that are out of the control of the party (i.e., juveniles have mitigated culpability because 
of factors associated with their age) 
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Myelination- insulation process which improves brain processes and allows structures in the 
brain to communicate more efficiently  
Parole- the release of a prisoner after a certain amount of time served and on the promise of 
good behavior 
Peer influence- pressure from social groups 
Prosecutorial discretion- decisions (such as pressing charges or determining the court setting) 
determined by the prosecutor (i.e., the District Attorney) 
Pruning- the removal of unused material in the brain 
Punitive measures- seeking punishment; punishment is the main priority 
Recidivism- when an offender re-offends 
Rehabilitation- the act of restoring someone from committing negative actions to becoming a 
productive, safe member of society through court-sanctioned treatments (i.e., prison time, 
therapy, work order) 
Risk-taking behaviors/Risky behavior- tendency to engage in behavior that can be dangerous or 
harmful 
Self-regulation/Self-regulatory abilities- the ability to control of one’s thoughts, actions, and 
feelings; the ability to inhibit behavior  
Transfer laws/Transfer- laws that allow or require juvenile offenders to be prosecuted as an adult 









In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Supreme Court of the United States (hereafter referred 
to as the Supreme Court or the Court) ruled that it was an unconstitutional violation of the cruel 
and unusual punishment provision in the 8th Amendment to give juvenile homicide offenders life 
sentences without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reached its decision citing public 
opinion against this practice, comparing this practice to that of other countries, and, most 
importantly, by citing psychological evidence including the fundamental differences between 
frontal lobe development in adult and juvenile offenders as well as the latter having a greater 
capacity for rehabilitation (Miller v. Alabama, 2012). It is important to note that, in 2005, the 
Supreme Court protected juveniles from receiving the death penalty citing many of the same 
reasons (Roper v. Simmons, 2005). These cases show that the Supreme Court has set precedents 
for protecting the rights of juvenile offenders on the basis of their unique mitigating qualities. 
These rulings legally recognize that juvenile offenders should be treated differently than adult 
offenders when it comes to criminal punishment. Furthermore, these decisions are sensitive to 
relevant psychological evidence about how to treat juveniles.  
Notably, the Miller v. Alabama decision only ruled that sentencing juveniles to 
mandatory life sentences was unconstitutional which has allowed for many inconsistencies about 
how juveniles should be treated when they are convicted of first-degree murder. However, the 
Supreme Court warned that harsh, lengthy sentences for juveniles convicted of first-degree 
murder should be uncommon, because very few juveniles have the maturity and depraved 
character that would justify a severe sanction (Miller v. Alabama, 2012). Many states have 
responded to this decision with sensitive sentencing standards for juveniles. On the other hand, 
JUVENILE SENTENCING REFORM  
5 
 
the state of Tennessee responded with a seemingly severe sentencing guideline that potentially 
violates the Miller v. Alabama ruling and does not appear to incorporate psychological evidence.  
Commonly referred to as the 51-to-life law, this Tennessee law requires that juvenile 
offenders tried and convicted as adults for first-degree murder be sentenced to a minimum of 51 
years before they become eligible for parole. Because of the Supreme Court protections in place 
for juvenile offenders, this is the only sentencing option for juvenile homicide offenders in 
Tennessee. The national standard average for life with parole is 25 years (Scott, Grisso, Levick, 
& Steinberg, 2015). This was the case in Tennessee as well until the 1995 “Truth in Sentencing” 
legislation, which was a collection of national sentencing legislation, stringently increased 
sentences for a variety of pre-decided crimes to expedite the sentencing decision process as well 
as to have a clear standard followed every time. With it, the average of life sentences with parole 
in Tennessee increased to 51-60 years served depending on behavior credits (Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 40-35-501(i)).  
Tennessee’s sentencing laws are strict because the state government appears to have a 
vested interest in public safety. The rationality behind this 51-to-life sentence may be based on 
how dangerous these offenders are perceived to be to the public. Balancing public safety 
concerns with the desire to punish while also considering offender rehabilitation is a difficult 
task (Brown, 2012). In this instance, Tennessee is relying primarily on punitive measures to 
allegedly protect the public. Tennessee’s problem is rational – a juvenile offender who has 
committed first-degree murder can potentially be very dangerous. Moreover, murder is the most 
serious offense one can commit, so swift and harsh punishment logically follows this crime. 
However, these concerns are variable in every situation – especially in the case of how to punish 
juvenile offenders. Tennessee seemingly does not recognize that juvenile offenders have a 
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greater capacity to be rehabilitated than do adults as well as mitigated culpability for their crimes 
because of their status as an under-developed child. Tennessee’s 51-to-life law is primarily 
punitive because this legislation may weigh public safety and the need for a perceived just 
punishment more heavily than concerns for the actual offender.  
This rationale may have something to do with the conservative ideals of the Tennessee 
populace. Insight into this issue comes from a study conducted in the past about Tennessee 
residents’ opinions on juvenile punishments. In 2000, Moon and colleagues conducted a study 
with Tennessee residents about their feelings towards the juvenile death penalty, juvenile life 
imprisonment, and other juvenile punishments. Note that this study was conducted before 
important Supreme Court decisions banning the juvenile death penalty (Roper v. Simmons, 2005) 
and banning life sentences for juveniles (Graham v. Florida, 2010; Miller v. Alabama, 2012). 
The results of the study showed that a majority of Tennessee respondents favored the death 
penalty for juveniles. Nearly two-thirds of the sample favored juvenile life imprisonment without 
parole. Finally, four-fifths of the sample favored life sentences for juvenile with work and 
restitution requirements (Moon, Wright, Cullen, & Pealer, 2000). This study may shine light on 
the attitudes informing legislation like the 51-to-life law. Tennessee is a conservative, southern 
state and its residents are often in favor of more conservative agendas – including punitive 
actions against juvenile offenders (Moon et al., 2000). When faced with the problem of 
restructuring juvenile sentencing standards, it is likely that Tennessee’s legislature attempted to 
incorporate its constituents’ ideals about juvenile punishment as well as attempting to protect 
public safety.   
Tennessee is by no means the only state that consistently transfers children to adult courts 
or rely on overly-punitive measures to sentence juveniles. The United States has a sordid history 
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with prosecuting juvenile offenders. Beginning in the 1980s, juvenile violent crimes increased – 
since then, rates of youth violent crimes have fluctuated (Jordan & McNeal, 2016). Due to this 
increase in the 1980s and growing public fear, many state legislatures enacted stricter laws to 
deal with these child “super predators.” “Super predator” is an antiquated term and now-
discredited hypothesis about children who are more susceptible to become violent offenders than 
the rest of the public, specifically this hypothesis targeted black, inner-city teenage males (Jordan 
& McNeal, 2016; Mears, Hay, Gertz, & Mancini, 2007). The thought was that these children had 
the physical attributes and presumed negative environmental influences necessary to become 
violent offenders, so when they are introduced to the justice system at a young age, they should 
be treated harshly in order to protect the public from their potentially more violent adult lives 
(Jordan & McNeal, 2016; Shook, 2013). The “super predator” hypothesis has since been 
discredited, but the legislation spurred by the fear of “super predators” persists today. In the 
1980s, many states already had transfer laws on their books, including Tennessee, but after the 
“super predator” scare, many passed stricter laws that allowed for more youth to be transferred 
and prosecuted in the adult system (Jordan & McNeal, 2016).     
Tennessee’s history with transfer laws demonstrates Tennessee’s tendency for punitive 
measures and disregard for the unique concerns of juvenile culpability. In Tennessee, juvenile 
offenders are automatically transferred to adult court if they are 16-years-old at the time of 
committing the offense of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, rape, aggravated rape, 
rape of a child, robbery, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, or any attempt 
to commit such offenses (Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-134). In instances of a child under 
the age of 16 committing a crime, special consideration is taken to decide whether to transfer the 
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child to adult court – primarily it is up to prosecutorial discretion, meaning the prosecutor 
decides to transfer based on precedent and the judges involved approve.  
According to Tennessee juvenile sentencing codes, one of the transfer considerations 
taken into account is whether the community’s interests call for the child to be legally restrained 
or disciplined, indicating a heavy interest in public protection (Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-
1-134(c)). Another consideration is whether the offense was against person or property with 
more serious transfer considerations given to crimes against a person, which includes the most 
serious offense against a person, first-degree murder (Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-
134(b)3). Tennessee’s code mentions that a child transferred to adult court may not be sentenced 
to the death penalty, which shows that Tennessee incorporated the Supreme Court’s opinion 
about juvenile death penalties, yet Tennessee has not adopted the Supreme Court’s ruling against 
juvenile life sentences into its code (Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-134(a)1). In summation, 
according to Tennessee’s transfer laws, juveniles 16 years-old and older will automatically 
transfer to adult court for violent crimes (i.e., homicide, rape, and aggravated robbery). One 
important reason that this is concerning is that research has shown that juveniles tried in adult 
courts are given harsher and longer punishments than adults, in terms of having a higher 
probability of being sentenced to longer incarceration times (Jordan & McNeal, 2016). This 
practice not only appears to ignore the unique mitigating qualities of juvenile offenders, but it 
may also treat juvenile offenders more harshly than adult offenders.   
Note that Tennessee has one law for the transfer of juveniles who commit a variety of 
violent crimes (i.e., homicide, rape, aggravated burglary), but Tennessee has separate sentencing 
laws for specific crimes (i.e., the 51-to-life law is a specific sentence for first-degree murder). 
Prior to the 1995 “Truth in Sentencing” reform legislation, Tennessee’s Code Annotated § 40-
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35-501(h)(1) detailed the release eligibility of defendants convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to life in prison. The subsection details that a life sentence amounts to sixty years and 
that the defendant becomes eligible for release after spending 60% of the sixty-year term. Under 
this provision, a defendant would become eligible for parole after serving 36 years. After the 
1995 legislation, Tennessee amended the code with a new subsection – Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 40-35-501(i). This new subsection provided that there is no release eligibility for a 
person convicted of first-degree murder and that the person must serve 100% of their sentence 
minus credits earned. The subsection also stipulates that no reduction to the sentence can be 
more than 15% (Tennessee Annotated Code § 40-35-501(i)). When interpreted together, these 
statutes (§ 40-35-501(h)(1) and § 40-35-501(i)) indicate that a person sentenced under these 
circumstances is not eligible for parole until 85% of a sixty-year sentence is served – 51 years. In 
Tennessee, there are only three sentencing options for first-degree murder: the death penalty, life 
in prison without the possibility of parole, and life with the possibility of parole after 51 years 
served. For transferred juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder, there is only one 
sentencing option: 51 years of their life spent behind bars before potential consideration for 
parole.  
When juveniles sentenced under the complex 51-to-life law have appealed their 
convictions, the state of Tennessee has continually upheld its minimum sentencing guideline as 
constitutional. The state has maintained that the Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama 
does not pertain to the 51-to-life law because the offender retains the possibility for release after 
serving 51-60 years (e.g., Cyntoia Denise Brown v. State of Tennessee). However, studies 
indicate that this 51-year mandatory sentence may be a life sentence (Patterson, 2013; 
Wildeman, 2016). It is up for debate whether this law violates the Supreme Court ruling; 
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however, it seems to not be debatable that this law disregards current psychological evidence that 
mitigates these offenders’ culpability. Currently, there are 119 men and women affected by this 
law and are serving time in Tennessee prisons because they were sentenced under the 51-to-life 
law (Associated Press, 2017).  
Juvenile Sentencing: Tennessee Compared to State and International Standards 
Tennessee’s minimum sentencing guidelines for transferred juveniles convicted of first-
degree murder are the strictest in the United States. After the Miller v. Alabama decision, most of 
the states in the U.S. had to reconsider their existing laws to make them compliant with the 
decision and consistent with the protections afforded to juvenile offenders in the Constitution. 
Many states re-evaluated their minimum sentencing guidelines and edited them to reflect a 
consideration for the mitigating circumstances surrounding juvenile culpability that the Supreme 
Court highlighted. For example, many states set minimum standards from anywhere between 5 
to 30 years before eligibility for parole. Some states took the opportunity to retroactively apply 
the decision to resentence inmates who were serving life sentence for crimes they committed as a 
juvenile. Tennessee is one of the only states that has not retroactively applied the decision – there 
are 13 inmates who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole as juveniles currently 
serving time in Tennessee (Associated Press, 2017). At this point in time, the Supreme Court has 
not decided to compel states to apply their decision retroactively.   
Even when compared to other conservative, southern states whose residents share many 
of the views that Tennessee residents hold and have also held interests of protecting public safety 
in high regard, Tennessee’s minimum sentence is more strict than other southern states. West 
Virginia, a geographically southern state that is complex in that it is sometimes conservative and 
other times liberal in the ideological leanings of the state legislature, amended its sentencing 
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guidelines in reaction to the Miller v. Alabama decision. Alabama, a comparatively conservative, 
southern state to Tennessee, also amended its sentencing guidelines. 
Tennessee varies greatly from West Virginia in terms of juvenile sentencing standards. 
West Virginia has a history of fluctuating from being a majority conservative state to a majority 
liberal state. The state provides an interesting example of a relaxed minimum juvenile sentencing 
guideline as compared to the other southern states. In 2016, West Virginia relaxed its minimum 
sentencing guidelines for juvenile homicide offenders to 15 years served before eligibility of 
parole. West Virginia has a history of being less punitive in their justice system exemplified by 
the state abolishing the death penalty in 1965 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2019). 
Furthermore, the state resentenced the 7 juvenile offenders that were serving life sentences to 
include the possibility for parole. In 2014, West Virginia joined 14 states and the District of 
Columbia to ban life sentences for juvenile offenders (Sheriff, 2015).  
Tennessee is also comparable to the conservative, southern state of Alabama. Prior to 
2012, Alabama did sentence some juvenile offenders to life without possibility of parole. 
Alabama had 72 inmates sentenced as juveniles who were serving life sentences, including Evan 
Miller, whose appeal served as the basis for the Supreme Court’s landmark Miller v. Alabama 
decision. At least 20 of these inmates have been resentenced following the Miller v. Alabama 
decision, and the state is working to resentence more (Associated Press, 2017). In 2016, Alabama 
set the minimum sentencing guideline for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder to 30 years 
served before the eligibility of parole. Alabama, geopolitically similar to Tennessee, is the sixth 
highest state in terms of rates of executions (Death Penalty Information Center, 2019). Alabama 
has a highly punitive justice system – they have executed 56 inmates since 1976 compared to 
Tennessee’s 6 executions (Death Penalty Information Center, 2019). Alabama, like Tennessee, 
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has yet to ban life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, leaving it 
technically on the books as an available sentencing option. Yet, despite this history of punitive 
measures, Alabama’s treatment of juvenile offenders reflects a sensitivity to research on the 
needs of young offenders concerning their mitigated culpability – as made evident by their 
decreased mandatory minimum sentences.   
Aside from state-level political differences, Tennessee’s minimum sentencing standard 
for juveniles sharply contrasts with standards held by other nations. No other democratic 
country’s justice system allows for the sentencing of juveniles to life without the possibility of 
parole (excluding countries that circumvent democratic justice systems to commit human rights 
violations) (Sheriff, 2015). Life sentences for juveniles are banned by multiple international 
covenants, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United 
States has signed but not ratified (Sheriff, 2015). The United States has been criticized by 
members of the United Nations for this policy that no other country in the world practices due to 
its perceived violation of human rights and mistreatment of children (Gately, 2015).  
With the current guidelines, juveniles tried as an adult and convicted of first-degree 
murder will be sentenced most strictly in the state of Tennessee as compared to anywhere else. 
This information suggests that Tennessee’s minimum sentencing standards are out-of-touch with 
modern society. With these considerations, it would be reasonable for Tennessee to consider 
adjusting its sentencing guidelines simply to align more with the standards set by the rest of the 
world. Furthermore, relaxing this guideline would potentially provide a more uniform sentencing 
standard within the United States.   
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Mitigating Qualities Due to Psychological Evidence 
Today, psychological evidence has been embraced as an important factor in determining 
legal issues (Gilfoyle & Dvoskin, 2017). In the past, psychological evidence was rejected as 
inadmissible in court settings due to its novelty, hard-to-understand jargon, and variability. The 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) marked the first 
accepted use of psychology as evidence in the legal system. In Brown vs. Board of Education, 
the justices accepted evidence in briefs submitted by psychologists regarding the social science 
on the effects of racial discrimination (Gilfoyle & Dvoskin, 2017). Since then, psychological 
evidence has been seriously considered in many legal decisions. 
 As evidenced by the Supreme Court’s Miller v. Alabama decision, mitigating 
psychological circumstances were considered in deciding that sentencing juvenile homicide 
offenders to life was an unconstitutional violation of their 8th Amendment rights. Prior Supreme 
Court cases set precedents that juvenile offenders have diminished culpability and greater 
prospects for reform, necessitating less than the most severe punishments (Graham v. Florida, 
2010; Roper v. Simmons, 2005). The Court also acknowledged in these cases that at the heart of 
retribution is a determination of the offender’s blameworthiness, and due to psychological 
mitigating circumstances, the case for retribution cannot be considered as strong with a minor as 
with an adult (Graham v. Florida, 2010). The Court has consistently implored lower courts to 
consider the mitigating qualities provided by their youth when sentencing juvenile offenders 
(Graham v. Florida, 2010; Miller v. Alabama, 2012; Roper v. Simmons, 2005). Following with 
their past decisions, the Supreme Court decided in Miller v. Alabama that imposing life 
sentences for juvenile homicide offenders is unconstitutional citing psychological evidence for 
hallmarks of the age of the offender (i.e., brain development and immaturity in regulatory 
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abilities), failure to resist peer influence, and a greater propensity for reform. This decision 
highlights the importance of considering the unique attributes of a juvenile offender during 
sentencing. 
Tennessee’s 51-to-life law seemingly fails to account for the unique and mitigating 
qualities of juvenile offenders. This law may be inappropriate because it does not address 
adolescents’ lack of brain development, diminished decision-making abilities, lowered ability to 
resist peer influence, and their greater ability to be rehabilitated when compared to adult 
offenders. A substantial amount of research in the field of developmental psychology supports 
the view that juvenile offenders should be distinguished from adult offenders in ways that 
mitigate their blame (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012; Izzo & Ross, 1990; Lamb & Malloy, 2012; 
Scott et al., 2015; Steinberg & Monahan, 2007).      
Lack of Brain Development and Diminished Decision-Making Abilities  
 One factor that should be considered when dealing with juvenile offenders is their brain 
maturation. A juvenile’s brain is anatomically less-developed than an adult’s brain and does not 
fully mature until adulthood, after 18 years of age; though some scientists contend that the brain 
does not fully develop until the age of 25 (Beckman, 2004; Lamb & Malloy, 2012; Steinberg & 
Monahan, 2007). Maturity in the frontal lobe has been correlated with higher cognitive functions, 
such as decision making and planning (Sowell, Thompson, Tessner, & Toga, 2001). The frontal 
lobe is underdeveloped in adolescence leading to surges in emotions and reward-seeking 
behaviors that are sometimes unable to be self-regulated or sophisticatedly inhibited by higher 
brain functions (Sowell et al., 2001). An understanding of brain development can illuminate 
explanatory reasons for adolescent crime as well as mitigating circumstances for adolescent 
culpability.  
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During adolescence, the brain undergoes a complex process of structural development. 
Specifically, the adolescent brain undergoes four major physical changes. First, early 
adolescence signifies an increase in the development of neurotransmitters like dopamine, which 
is known as the “reward” or “pleasure” neurotransmitter (Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008). This 
increase in dopamine may cause an increase in risk-taking behavior that releases this rewarding 
feeling (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012). Second, throughout childhood and especially in 
adolescence the brain undergoes “pruning,” the removal of unused material in the brain, which 
leads to more efficient brain processes. Pruning is especially important for the prefrontal cortex 
which can explain why there is a marked observation of improved executive functions, such as 
planning and the ability to inhibit behavior, in adolescence as compared to childhood. Third, the 
adolescent brain undergoes more improvements such as myelination, an insulation process which 
improves brain processes, such as facilitating enhanced communication between different areas 
of the brain (Casey et al., 2008). Finally, the frontal lobe region matures which leads to improved 
and more mature emotional and self-regulatory control abilities (Casey et al., 2008; Cauffman & 
Steinberg, 2012). Essentially, there is complex and rapid change occurring over time and at 
different intervals in adolescent brains that affects decision-making and executive functions. 
These milestones that the brain endures during adolescence is a marked physical difference 
between juveniles and adults. Criminal behavior in juveniles can be explained by studying these 
physical milestones. For example, a juvenile’s brain undergoing myelination and pruning 
indicates that the structures in their brain are not effectively communicating because the 
passageways of communication are not fully developed yet.  
Moreover, during adolescence, cortical development is underway beginning with older 
regions of the brain and ending with newer regions, with the last regions to mature being the 
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regions associated with higher-order processes (Gogtay et al., 2004). The frontal lobe and 
prefrontal cortex, which are responsible for decision-making and the many self-regulatory 
abilities, does not completely mature until sometime after 18-years of age (Cohen & Casey, 
2013; Gogtay et al., 2004; Lamb & Malloy, 2012). A supported theory contends that two systems 
in the brain (the socioemotional and the cognitive control systems) develop at different rates 
which shows the socioemotional system, which is linked to sensation seeking, reacting rapidly 
with no check from the underdeveloped cognitive control system (Lamb & Malloy, 2012, Scott 
& Steinberg, 2008). Due to an adolescent’s changing and maturing brain, they are more prone to 
surges in emotion and reward-seeking without a sophisticated ability to self-regulate those 
impulses (Scott & Steinberg, 2008). This dual-systems theory could provide an explanation for 
adolescent crimes and provide support for their mitigated culpability.    
Evidence supports another theory that unequal maturity in the structures of the brain 
leads to an imbalance in their activity, which then leads to an over-reliance on the already-
developed emotional regions of the brain rather than the undeveloped logical regions of the brain 
(Somerville, Hare, & Casey, 2010). Without the mature decision-making regions of the brain 
acting in a complementary fashion, a juvenile’s behaviors may be less sophisticated, meaning 
being without the self-regulatory abilities that come with maturation, relative to an adult’s 
behaviors (Somerville et al., 2010; Cohen & Casey, 2013). This theory could also provide an 
explanation for adolescent crimes and provide more support for their mitigated culpability.    
 The under-developed brain leads juveniles to have diminished decision-making 
capabilities due to the lack of maturation in the decision-making structures of the brain. For 
example, studies have found that adolescents lack a “future orientation,” or the ability to consider 
the long-term effects of their actions, which leads to adolescents assigning less risk to their 
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actions (Greene, 1986; Scott & Steinberg, 2008). Future orientation influences judgment because 
it affects the extent to which individuals consider the long-term consequences of their actions in 
making choices which is especially important regarding a choice with serious consequences, 
such as breaking a law. When compared to adults, adolescents weigh risks and benefits 
differently, considering potential gains more importantly than losses (Scott & Steinberg, 2008). 
There is also evidence linking differences in future orientation to age differences in brain 
structure and function, especially in the prefrontal cortex (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012). 
Adolescents tend to have more immature judgments about social situations, which should be 
considered when assessing adolescent criminal activity.    
Moreover, studies have shown that the capacity to regulate one’s emotions and actions 
increases as one gets older (Scott & Steinberg, 2008). Self-regulatory abilities and social-
emotional competence are developed with the prefrontal cortex, which is one of the last 
structures in the brain to mature (Stuss, 2010). When compared with an adult’s ability to self-
regulate, adults have a greater capacity to control their behaviors. For example, adolescents are 
prone to more rapid mood swings which could indicate difficulties with self-control (Scott & 
Steinberg, 2008). Additionally, studies have indicated that adolescents tend to respond to fearful 
situations with unchecked activity in the emotional structures of the brain (i.e., the amygdala) 
whereas adults react with activity in the amygdala, which is where fear activity occurs in the 
brain, as well as in the frontal lobe indicating that adults reason through the fearful situations and 
adolescents do not (Baird et al., 1999; Beckman, 2004). These examples show that brain 
development must be considered when sentencing a juvenile offender. Treating a juvenile as an 
adult in the justice system does not account for the physical and mental differences between 
juvenile and adult offenders due to their differing brain development. Adolescent brain 
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development provides physical evidence for treating juvenile offenders differently and in ways 
that mitigate their blame for their behaviors.   
Poor Resistance to Peer Influence 
 Another factor that is believed to greatly contribute to adolescent decision-making is the 
influence from their peers. Note that the Supreme Court cited poor resistance to peer influence in 
its assessment of juvenile offenders in Miller v. Alabama. The Court was not indicating that peer 
influence may be a factor leading juveniles to commit first-degree murder. However, the Court’s 
decision did indicate that peer influence is a measurable mitigating circumstance that can 
highlight the differences between adult and juvenile offenders in a way that mitigates juvenile 
culpability. A juvenile’s susceptibility to peer influence appears to be a demonstrable signal of a 
mitigating quality.   
Peer pressure is commonly cited as a reason for adolescent risk-taking and delinquency 
(Steinberg & Monahan, 2007). Susceptibility to peer influence is highest in adolescence and is 
likely to influence how an adolescent makes decisions and to engage in anti-social behavior, 
such as illegal activities (Moffitt, 1993). In many instances of adolescent crime, the offender may 
commit the crime due to pressure felt from their peers.  
One explanation of peer influence stresses the importance of an adolescent’s perceived 
acceptance in a group. As individuals begin to sort themselves into groups, both perceived and 
actual pressure to adopt the styles, values, and interests of one’s friends may intensify as an 
attempt to foster solidarity and uniformity within the group (Brown, 2004; Steinberg & 
Monahan, 2007). Attempting to fit in with a group can lead to groupthink or thinking as a group 
in ways that discourage individual responsibility, which is one of the main causes of criminal 
behavior in peer groups (Esiri, 2016). Because of a juvenile’s diminished decision-making 
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abilities, they are more susceptible to peer influence and groupthink, which is another possible 
factor that influences adolescent crime (Esiri, 2016; Steinberg & Monahan, 2007). Peer influence 
may influence an adolescent’s decisions both directly and indirectly. For example, an adolescent 
may decide on an action because peers have coerced them into doing so or because of the 
pressures of groupthink or they may do so to earn the perceived approval of their peers (Esiri, 
2016; Moffitt, 1993). This is believed to be the explanation as to why juveniles are more likely to 
commit group crimes than adults (Scott & Steinberg, 2008).  
Adolescents are more susceptible to peer influence than adults, meaning their increased 
susceptibility to peer pressure and groupthink may or may not have long-term consequences 
when peers are engaging in risky or criminal behavior (Brown, 2004; Steinberg & Monahan, 
2007). Resistance to peer influence increases between adolescence and adulthood as a person 
becomes more independent and the capacity for decision-making matures (Cauffman & 
Steinberg, 2012). An adult offender has a greater capacity to resist peer influence more so than a 
juvenile offender due to brain maturation in the frontal lobe, as well as, having greater personal 
autonomy (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012). This information may need to be considered when 
assessing a juvenile’s case because they do not appear to have the same mature brain capabilities 
to resist this pressure that adults have. If an adolescent cannot reasonably be expected to react as 
an adult would, it does seem reasonable to punish them as if they could.  
Capacity for Rehabilitation  
It has been well established that most juvenile offenders “age out” of crime (Lamb & 
Malloy, 2012; Moffit, 1993). After adolescence, most juvenile offenders do not offend again, 
meaning few juvenile offenders become adult offenders (Lamb & Malloy, 2012). There is a 
debate to explain whether offenders will persist in their criminal or antisocial behavior 
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throughout the remainder of their life. A theory purports that some offenders are life-time 
persistent offenders due to chronic antisocial behavior beginning in childhood that contributes to 
a lifelong pathology involving crime (Moffitt, 1993). However, the theory also indicates that 
most juvenile offenders are only adolescence-limited offenders who simply employ antisocial 
tendencies in normative ways or whose antisocial behavior desists after their teenage years 
(Moffit, 1993). It has been shown that crime peaks in adolescence and rapidly decreases 
throughout the twenties and declines slowly through the other ages (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 
1983). The FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data shows that the peak age of crime 
involvement is younger than twenty-five for all crimes except for gambling, and these rates 
begin to decline during the late teen years for most of these crimes (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2017). The current practice in the criminal justice system of treating all adolescent 
offenders as if they are lifetime-persistent offenders, as evidenced by the overly-punitive 
measures in place, may be inappropriate because the evidence suggests that juvenile offenders 
will most likely not reoffend as adults (Lamb & Malloy, 2012; Moffit, 1993). This implies that 
juvenile offenders naturally rehabilitate and cease criminal behavior, and that they have a great 
capacity to be rehabilitated. This might indicate that juvenile offenders could be successfully 
treated with a rehabilitative strategy rather than punitively (Landenberger, & Lipsey, 2005).  
In support of this idea, many studies have found that juvenile offenders treated in juvenile 
detention centers are far less likely to recidivate, or to reoffend, than juveniles treated in adult 
facilities (Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005; Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). This could indicate that 
juveniles have a greater capacity to be rehabilitated if they are treated as juveniles rather than as 
adults. Evidence suggests that juveniles treated in the juvenile justice system with cognitive 
strategies, such as programs that emphasize cognitive behavioral therapy, show greater decreases 
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in recidivism than juveniles treated in the adult prison system (Izzo & Ross, 1990; Landenberger 
& Lipsey, 2005; Redondo, Sanchez-Meca, & Garrido, 1999). Cognitive behavioral therapy 
(CBT) targets one’s thoughts and behaviors and then encourages one to make positive changes to 
them (Clark, 2010). This style of therapy presumes that a person's thoughts are the result of their 
environment and experiences, and behavior is influenced by these thoughts, which may at times 
become distorted and fail to reflect reality accurately (Clark, 2010). CBT targets these thoughts 
and attempts to change the way a person thinks about certain situations and, in turn, how they 
behave, which has been found to be effective with samples of juvenile and adult offenders, 
including violent offenders (e.g., Lambie & Randall, 2013; Lane, Lanza-Kaduce, Frazier, & 
Bishop, 2002). In most prison CBT programs, offenders improve their social skills, problem-
solving, moral reasoning, and self-regulatory abilities (Clark, 2010). Juvenile offenders exposed 
to CBT-based programs, even violent juvenile offenders, such as those who commit homicide, 
tend to not reoffend (Lambie & Randall, 2013).  
Juvenile rehabilitation programs tend to focus more on educational and counseling 
opportunities rather than on punishment, which has been shown to reduce recidivism rates of 
juvenile offenders (Basta & Davidson, 1988; Lane et al., 2002). Studies have shown that violent 
juvenile offenders treated in juvenile facilities are more successfully rehabilitated due to the 
prevalence of CBT interventions and educational opportunities provided (Lambie & Randall, 
2013; Redondo et al., 1999). The strategies employed in most juvenile detention centers, which 
focus on rehabilitation and engagement in prosocial activities, offer long-term positive outcomes, 
meaning the offenders are allowed to become productive members of society (Basta & Davidson, 
1988; Moore, Philippe, West, Campbell, & Grubb, 2016). These programs usually offer 
instruction of trade skills, have classrooms and instructors to aid in obtaining an education, and 
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have token and reward systems to curb inappropriate behavior. Research has suggested that 
juvenile offenders decrease or end their criminal behavior once they become more 
developmentally mature, are taught prosocial behaviors, and as they gain work or school 
opportunities (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2012; Moore et al., 2016). These findings suggest that 
using punitive measures with juvenile offenders, such as sending them to adult prisons, is not 
effective and that more developmentally-appropriate rehabilitative strategies should be 
employed.  
Dangers Juvenile Offenders Face in Adult Prison Facilities 
The practice of placing juvenile offenders in adult prison facilities, a practice found in 44 
states in the U.S., is a concerning issue that has not been shown to effectively reduce recidivism 
in these offenders (Austin, Johnson, & Gregoriou, 2000). In Tennessee, any juvenile offender 
transferred and convicted as an adult will also be housed in adult facilities. Adult prison facilities 
have been found to have serious detrimental impacts on the juveniles incarcerated in these 
programs, such as sexual assault, physical assault, suicide, and negative environmental 
influences (Angell, 2004; Flaherty, 1983; Maitland & Sluder, 1998). This evidence suggests that 
adult prisons are both physically and mentally dangerous for juveniles and may not be 
appropriate placements for juvenile offenders.   
Rape and Sexual Assault   
It is difficult to get accurate data on the incident rates of rapes and sexual assaults in 
prisons due to under-reporting and variations in reporting (Angell, 2004; Schiraldi & Zeidenberg, 
1997). For example, most prisons report rapes as a simple “inmate assaults” effectively under-
reporting the actual nature of the assault (Angell, 2004; Schiraldi & Zeidenberg, 1997). In 2004, 
the rate of sexual assault in adult facilities was 2.91 per 1,000 incarcerated prisoners, although 
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the actual extent of sexual assault in these facilities is still unknown (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2004). Five times as many juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons report that they were the 
victims of attempted sexual assaults or rape as compared to juvenile offenders housed in juvenile 
facilities (Austin et al., 2000; Schiraldi & Zeidenberg, 1997). A 2004 study showed that 7.7 
percent of all victims in substantiated incidents of violence perpetrated by prisoners in adult 
facilities were under the age of 18 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004). Youthful appearance, 
small stature, and lack of experience in correctional facilities have been shown to increase the 
risk of sexual assault by other prisoners because they may be easier targets (Schiraldi & 
Zeidenberg, 1997).  
It is important to note that girls are disproportionately represented among sexual assault 
victims in prison. Thirty-six percent of all victims in substantiated incidents of sexual violence 
were female, despite girls representing only fifteen percent of incarcerated juvenile offenders 
(Schiraldi & Zeidenberg, 1997). Furthermore, girls are much more at risk of sexual abuse by 
staff than by their peers (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004). 
Physical Assault and Victimization  
Physical assault is common in the prison system, but juveniles in adult prisons are 
disproportionately the victims of these assaults. Juveniles housed in prisons were nearly twice as 
likely to report being physically assaulted by staff than by other prisoners (Forst, Fagen, & 
Vivona, 1989). Moreover, research has suggested that youth in prison are twice as likely to 
report having been beaten by staff compared to youth in juvenile detention centers (Forst et al., 
1989). Juveniles in adult facilities are fifty percent more likely to be assaulted by weapon than 
those in juvenile facilities (Forst et al., 1989; Schiraldi & Zeidenberg, 1997).  
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Juveniles in adult prisons also face physical violence from fellow prison inmates, as well 
as verbal harassment and theft (Maitland & Sluder, 1998). As victims of violence in the prison 
setting, juvenile offenders then later tend to become perpetrators of violence (Maitland & Sluder, 
1998). Often, juvenile offenders are cited as being involved in breaking prison rules for fighting, 
but this could be because they are often the target of such physical attacks and are defending 
themselves. Moreover, the prison environment encourages and even requires physically fighting 
out of self-defense, while normalizing participation in violence at the same time (Maitland & 
Sluder, 1998).      
Suicide 
Juvenile offenders housed in adult prison facilities are also more likely to commit suicide 
than those in juvenile detention centers (Daniel, 2006). The suicide rate for juvenile offenders in 
adult prison facilities is 7 to 8 times higher than those in juvenile facilities (Daniel, 2006; 
Flaherty, 1983). Another prior study supported these findings showing that offenders aged 15 to 
21 made up only 13 percent of the prison population, yet they accounted for 22 percent of the 
suicides (Schiraldi & Zeidenberg, 1997). Often, juvenile offenders are placed in isolation so as to 
“protect” them from the dangers of other prisoners. In solitary confinement, juveniles remain 
isolated for 23 hours a day with 1 hour for recreation that is also spent in isolation. Forced 
solitary confinement can lead to physical and emotional issues (Flaherty, 1983). This observation 
suggests that the practice of sending juvenile offenders to adult prisons facilitates suicide.    
It has also been found that rates of suicide in juvenile detention centers are less than rates 
of adolescent suicides in the general population (Flaherty, 1983). With this consideration in 
mind, it alludes to the fact that adult prison facilities are extremely dangerous places for youth to 
be housed. Rates of youth suicide are higher in adult prisons than to those in juvenile facilities 
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and in the general population, which indicates that adult prisons are not appropriate or healthy 
for juvenile offenders (Scott et al., 2015).   
Negative Environmental Influences  
Juveniles transferred to adult prison systems face disruption in their identity formation, 
relationships, growth in skills and competencies, emotional regulatory abilities, and positive 
movement into adult status (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). Evidence suggests that the prison 
environment challenges one’s identity and value systems even for adults and hardened criminals 
(Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). When an adolescent, who is particularly vulnerable, enters this 
system during a stage in their life where they are discovering their own identities and values, 
they are at particular risk for maladjustment (Monahan, Steinberg, Cauffman, & Mulvey, 2009; 
Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). The adult prison environment does not promote physical or 
emotional wellbeing, it usually promotes violence and criminal activity by placing juveniles with 
older criminals who influence them. Placing juveniles in an environment that is not physically or 
mentally safe harms the adolescent’s process of forming a healthy identity and value system, 
especially when that environment promotes unhealthy values (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012).  
Identity formation is a process of finding one’s sense of self during adolescence (Collins 
& Steinberg, 2006). In order to do this, most adolescents discover their personalities and values, 
or sense of self, through interactions with parents and peers while integrating facets of these 
interactions into a self-identity (Collins & Steinberg, 2006). An important consideration for this 
process is that adolescents have access to healthy relationships with parents and peers, as well as 
the opportunity to make autonomous decisions (Collins & Steinberg, 2006). Adolescents 
attempting to form their identities in an adult prison face dangers and pressures that prevent 
healthy identity-formation (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). Peers in prison consist of criminals who 
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promote criminal identities and behavior, such as violence, that undermine healthy development 
(Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). The experience in prison is not intended to foster an adolescent’s 
ability to form a healthy identity, rather it forces adolescents to blend in and conform to 
unhealthy standards while also subjecting them to unsafe conditions.  
Moreover, the prison environment curtails an adolescent’s ability to learn vital social and 
life skills, such as interacting with a romantic partner, managing a household, gaining work-
related skills, and job expectations through trial and error in the real world. The prison 
environment is so highly restrictive and monitored that it effectively prevents these learning 
opportunities from occurring (Collins & Steinberg, 2006). Prison not only stunts an adolescent’s 
identity formation, but it also prevents an adolescent from learning critical skills necessary for 
becoming an adult.       
Recidivism  
One of the main ideas informing the policy of transferring juveniles to adult prison 
systems was that this harsher punishment would deter these offenders from re-offending. 
Moreover, the idea was that this harsh punishment would deter other juveniles from committing 
crimes because they would know the potential harsh repercussions. Prior research has found that 
transferring youth does not decrease recidivism rates in these offenders (Bishop & Frazier, 2000; 
Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). In fact, transferred juvenile offenders are more likely to recidivate, 
recidivate at a greater rate, and to commit a more serious offense later than adolescents in the 
juvenile justice system (Bishop & Frazier, 2000). Moreover, transferred youth face many 
hardships when they are released back into the community. A majority of youth released from 
adult prisons continue to display antisocial tendencies and are often rearrested (Mulvey & 
Schubert, 2012). Adult prisons do not rehabilitate juvenile offenders or prevent them from re-




Implications of the Evidence: The Need for Developmentally-Appropriate Strategies 
Many facets of how juvenile offenders are treated would benefit from being informed by 
the evidence base of developmental science. Psychological development continues throughout 
adolescence and into young adulthood in ways that are relevant to the how an adolescent’s 
culpability is appraised when they have committed a crime. Many of the social and emotional 
capacities that influence adolescents’ judgment and decision-making continue to mature into late 
adolescence and beyond (Cohen & Casey, 2013; Somerville et al., 2010). Compared to adults, 
adolescents are more emotionally variable and impulsive, less future-oriented, and more 
susceptible to peer influence (Moffitt, 1993; Scott & Steinberg, 2008). This scientifically-
informed understanding of adolescence does not excuse juvenile offenders from punishment for 
violent crimes, but it should factor into their culpability. Moreover, the idea that children and 
adults are different is not new; those under 18 years-old have always been referred to as 
“minors” and “juveniles” because they are considered something inherently different than adult. 
Because American laws and precedents show that diminished judgment mitigates criminal 
responsibility (i.e., mentally challenged individuals found unfit to stand trial), it is reasonable to 
conclude that adolescents are inherently less blameworthy than adults in ways that should affect 
decisions about criminal punishment.  
  Furthermore, developmental science and the dangers present in the adult prison situation 
should inform how juvenile offenders are punished. It has been shown in a number of ways that 
adult prison facilities are dangerous and inappropriate placements for juvenile offenders. 
Moreover, juvenile offenders have a greater capacity for rehabilitation if treated appropriately for 
their age. It has been established that most juvenile offenders “age out” of crime (Lamb & 
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Malloy, 2012; Moffit, 1993). Juvenile offenders are not likely to reoffend as adults if treated age-
appropriately, such as being kept in juvenile detention centers. Juvenile offenders are less likely 
to reoffend if they are kept in the juvenile justice system, but they do tend to reoffend if they are 
transferred to the adult justice system (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). Juvenile offenders who 
remain in juvenile facilities are more successfully rehabilitated when treated with cognitive 
strategies, such as programs that emphasize cognitive behavioral therapy (Izzo & Ross, 1990; 
Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005).  
Additionally, adult prisons are an extremely dangerous place for juvenile offenders, as 
they are at a substantially higher risk for rape, assault, and committing suicide than those in 
juvenile detention centers (Schiraldi & Zeidenberg, 1997). The adult prison system is also 
developmentally and mentally damaging to adolescents, limiting many from developing healthy 
identities, while potentially even encouraging them to form positive ideas about criminal 
lifestyles in order to survive the environment (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). Placing juvenile 
offenders in adult prisons tends to make these offenders more likely to re-offend in the future 
upon their release (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012).  
Transferring juveniles to the adult system does not appropriately reflect the 
developmental evidence that adolescents are fundamentally different from adults. Punishing 
juvenile offenders as adults does not appear to deter future offending, which is allegedly the 
purported goal of this practice (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). The current practice of transferring 
juveniles to the adult system is a physical and mental punishment and not an effective treatment 
for crime. Regarding the evidence, it is not appropriate to treat juveniles as adults. In fact, it 
appears to be a cruel and unusual punishment to subject juvenile offenders to the harsh realities 
of adult prisons. Taken together, the developmental science and studies of the effects of adult 
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prison on juvenile offenders suggest that transferring juvenile offenders, even violent offenders, 
is an inappropriate practice (e.g., Izzo & Ross, 1990; Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005; Mulvey & 
Schubert, 2012). There is a need for the maintenance of a separate juvenile justice system in 
which adolescents are judged, tried, and punished in developmentally-appropriate ways. 
It does not appear that Tennessee’s 51-to-life law considers the developmental science 
that shows the difference between adolescents and adults. The law does not appear to consider 
the offender’s brain development, diminished decision-making abilities, or their greater capacity 
for rehabilitation into account. It seemingly treats juvenile offenders as just as culpable as adult 
offenders. Tennessee’s practices allow juvenile offenders sentenced under the 51-to-life law to 
be placed in adult prisons, which may be a cruel and unusual punishment because it does not 
rehabilitate the offender, it simply subjects them to danger. With evidence of juvenile offenders’ 
ability to be rehabilitated and respecting their mitigated status as adolescents, this law needs to 
be reformed into a policy that is more age-appropriate and informed by psychological evidence 
that also attempts to rehabilitate these offenders. Juveniles offenders convicted under 
Tennessee’s 51-to-life law deserve to be treated fairly and appropriately as pursuant to their 8th 
Amendment rights. Moreover, these offenders have the potential to reform their lives and 
become productive members of society if Tennessee’s practices provided them the opportunity to 
do so. Despite the severe nature of their crimes, these juvenile offenders must be treated with 
respect and sensitivity due to their status as a child.  
Policy Proposal 
In Tennessee, the evidence suggests that there is a need for a sentencing policy that 
embraces a developmental perspective and recognizes that it is counterproductive to ignore the 
differences between juvenile offenders and adult offenders. To remedy Tennessee’s 51-to-life 
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law and treatment of juvenile offenders, multiple levels of the issue may need to be addressed. 
There are three proposed strategies that could be taken to remedy Tennessee’s law and treatment 
of juvenile offenders. These approaches are practical and reflect both the developmental science 
related to this issue as well as Tennessee’s need for punitive action. These three strategies 
involve: 
I. Revising Tennessee’s transfer laws to involve a case-by-case assessment 
II. Revising the minimum sentence for juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree 
murder in the adult setting (i.e., the 51-to-life law) 
III. Implementing a case-by-case sentencing model for juvenile offenders charged with 
first-degree murder. 
I. Revising Tennessee’s Transfer Laws 
The main issue contributing to juvenile offenders being sentenced under the 51-to-life 
law is how easily juveniles are transferred to adult courts and sanctioned as adults. The evidence 
suggests that no effective change in the treatment of these juvenile offenders can take place if 
Tennessee’s transfer laws are not revisited. It may no longer be feasible to treat any offender 
under the age of 18 as if they have adult-like culpability. The Supreme Court has recognized that 
the difference between juveniles and adult offenders is not crime-specific (Graham v. Florida, 
2010). Tennessee’s practice of automatically transferring juveniles to adult courts for first-degree 
murder charges appears to be crime-specific reasoning. It is the assumption that the nature of the 
crime negates the need to view the offender’s mitigating qualities of youth, which means the 
state views the crime as something only an adult-like offender can commit and should be 
punished as such. Tennessee’s automatic transfer of juvenile offenders charged with first-degree 
murder seemingly disregards current psychological evidence that supports separated treatment of 
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adults and juveniles. There is substantial scientific evidence (i.e., brain development and capacity 
for rehabilitation) that indicates that juvenile offenders should be treated as delinquent rather 
than as criminal. Furthermore, Tennessee’s automatic transfer law for first-degree murder 
appears to disregard the Supreme Court’s declaration that juveniles cannot be considered among 
the worst offenders (Roper v. Simmons, 2005). This suggests that juvenile offenders should be 
kept in the juvenile justice system rather than transferred to adult court.  
A revision of Tennessee’s transfer laws may be appropriate in order to be more sensitive 
to the needs of juveniles and to recognize their mitigated culpability. Tennessee’s transfer laws 
need to be revised by removing the automatic transfer for certain crimes. Currently, in 
Tennessee, juveniles older than 16 years of age will automatically be transferred to adult court 
for violent crimes (i.e., homicide, rape, and aggravated robbery). Special consideration is taken 
to determine if a child under the age of 16 should be transferred with heavy consideration for 
public safety (Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-134). Removing the automatic transfer of 
juvenile offenders charged with first-degree murder would prevent juveniles being tried as adults 
and subjected to the 51-to-life law.  
In Tennessee, juvenile offenders convicted in juvenile court for the crime of first-degree 
murder are typically placed into juvenile detention centers and released upon turning either 18 or 
21 years-old (Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-137). Most resistance to keeping older juvenile 
offenders in the juvenile justice system is that they will spend little time compared to their 
younger counterparts being rehabilitated. For example, if a 17-year-old convicted of first-degree 
murder is kept in the juvenile justice system, they will be released in anywhere from one to four 
years. Whereas a 13-year-old convicted for the same crime and kept in the juvenile justice 
system will be released in anywhere from five to eight years. It seems that the younger offender 
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would benefit more from the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile justice system as compared to 
the older offender because they must spend more time there. Moreover, keeping more violent 
juvenile offenders from juvenile detention centers may be an effort to protect the juveniles 
housed in these facilities. This idea could be informing much of the legislation behind transfer 
laws because the time an older juvenile offender would spend in the juvenile justice system may 
be viewed as insufficient. It should also be noted that in some cases, a juvenile offender may be 
sentenced to a blended sentence of spending time in a juvenile facility until they are 18 and then 
being transferred (Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-137).  
This proposal involves removing the Tennessee transfer law that indicates that those over 
the age of 16 should automatically be transferred to adult court for certain violent crimes (i.e., 
Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-134). In response to a modern understanding of their 
mitigating circumstances, juvenile offenders charged with first-degree murder brought before a 
juvenile court should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine if transfer is necessary. 
Unless there are concerning issues, such as repeated violence while being detained or signs of 
mental illness, the offender should then be processed and adjudicated within the juvenile justice 
system. Factors that should be considered include age at the time of the crime, maturity, 
susceptibility to peer influence, appreciation of risk, capacity for rehabilitation, and the 
circumstances of the offense. Moreover, juvenile courts should consider the evidence that adult 
prisons do not reduce recidivism in juvenile offenders (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). Essentially, 
the mitigating factors that contribute to a lessening of juvenile offenders’ blameworthiness 
should be considered, and, more times than not, when they are considered and weighed 
appropriately, the defendant will not need to be transferred to adult court.  
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Of course, there are circumstances that would make it appropriate to treat juvenile 
offenders in the adult system, but these circumstances are likely rare. For example, there are 
juvenile offenders who are potentially extremely dangerous and should not be allowed to return 
to society, such as mentally disturbed individuals who do not have the capacity to be 
rehabilitated and cannot be left unsupervised. These cases are rare because the majority of 
juvenile offenders will grow out of their criminal ways and become productive members of 
society – if they are given the opportunity to do so (Mulvey & Schubert, 2012). It has been 
shown that treating juvenile offenders in the juvenile justice system is more effective than the 
adult system, even for the most serious offenders (Lambie & Randell, 2013; Lane et al., 2002). 
The evidence supports the idea that juveniles should be treated as juveniles by keeping them in 
the juvenile justice system.  
II. Revising Tennessee’s 51-to-Life Law 
 Tennessee’s 51-to-life law for sentencing juvenile offenders has been shown to be 
inappropriate in many ways. First, the law does not appear to acknowledge scientific evidence 
that suggests juvenile offenders have mitigated culpability when compared to adult offenders. 
Second, it may be overly punitive in a way that ignores evidence of these offenders’ ability to 
effectively be rehabilitated in a juvenile detention facility. In fact, the evidence suggests that this 
law facilitates the recidivism of these offenders by sentencing them to harsh punishments in an 
adult prison facility. Third, it may be a violation of the protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment provided in the 8th Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that giving juveniles 
life sentences without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional (Miller v. Alabama, 2012). 
While the 51-to-life law gives the possibility of parole after 51 to 60 years served, this is still 
essentially a life sentence. In the general population, life expectancy is nearly 80 years, but life 
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expectancy in prison dramatically decreases for each year spent in prison, and the chances of a 
juvenile offender living past the minimum 51-years in prison is unlikely (Patterson, 2013; 
Wildeman, 2016). Last, Tennessee’s 51-to-life law can be viewed as effectively throwing away 
the lives of young people, who could otherwise become productive members of society.  
 Past legislation to decrease the minimum sentence has not gained much traction in 
Tennessee. In 2016, lawmakers proposed reducing this sentence to 15 years served before the 
possibility of parole, but the Tennessee legislature rejected the proposal (e.g., Tennessee Senate 
Bill 2090). This failed bill attempted to introduce a mandatory consideration of the offenders’ 
mitigating qualities, including age at the time of the crime, level of participation in the crimes, 
impulsivity, family and community environment, ability to appreciate risks, intellectual capacity, 
and available outcomes from mental health assessments (Tennessee Senate Bill 2090). The 
inclusion of these provisions is a promising start for Tennessee lawmakers to include more 
sensitivity for relevant scientific support in favor of juvenile offenders’ mitigated culpability. At 
this time, judges in Tennessee do not have to consider any of these circumstances when 
sentencing transferred offenders with the exception of age, which is considered solely because a 
life sentence cannot be imposed on a minor.  
 It is likely that this bill did not pass because it was viewed as too lenient and not as a 
severe enough punishment for a severe crime. Tennessee has demonstrated that it favors the 
interests of the public over the interests of the offender in these cases. However, shown by the 
psychological evidence available today, Tennessee’s current, punitive treatment of these juvenile 
offenders may not be necessary for the protection of the public (Scott et al., 2015).  
 Recent movements to release offenders sentenced under the 51-to-life law have garnered 
state and national attention. The national conversation has highlighted public opinion that this 
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law is unfair and impractical (Wadhwani & Tamburin, 2019). It has been considered 
unreasonable that in Tennessee a juvenile offender will be given a 51-year sentence for a crime 
that would only receive a 15-year sentence in another state. This recent national conversation 
may lead to real change to this law. For example, during the new term of the Tennessee State 
Legislature, which began in January 2019, there are plans to push a measure to reduce the 
minimum sentence to 20 years before the eligibility of parole (Wadhwani & Tamburin, 2019). 
The measure will be voted on in July of 2019 and is a promising start for Tennessee to fix this 
issue. 
 This proposal involves revising Tennessee’s current minimum sentencing guidelines for 
juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, the 51-to-life law, rather than abolishing the 
guidelines all together. It would most likely not be practical to not have any protections and 
standards in place at all in the instance that a juvenile offender comes before a court for 
sentencing for such a crime. Specific guidelines are necessary in sentencing to ensure that no one 
offender is treated unfairly. Until this reform, it is likely that juvenile offenders convicted of 
first-degree murder will continue to be transferred to adult courts in Tennessee and subjected to 
the current sentencing guidelines.  
 Considering recent attention given to Tennessee’s 51-to-life law, the public and 
legislature appear to be ready to substantially reduce this minimum sentencing requirement. 
Following the example of other states, lowering the minimum sentence for a juvenile convicted 
of first-degree murder in an adult court to 15 years served before the eligibility of parole should 
be considered. Tennessee Code § 40-35-501(h)(1) and subsection 40-35-501(i) should be 
replaced with a single, clear standard that reduces this sentence to a 15-year mandatory minimum 
sentence if the offender is tried in adult court. In an attempt to be responsive to the safety needs 
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of the juvenile population, a provision should be included that allows for a blended sentence, 
meaning that the juvenile offender would remain in a juvenile detention center until they turn 21-
years-old before being transferred to an adult facility. This reduction in the minimum sentencing 
standard and requirement of a blended sentence would be more responsive to the current 
developmental science that indicates a juvenile offender should be treated differently than an 
adult offender (Scott et al., 2015). Furthermore, this reform would potentially maintain 
Tennessee’s interest in punitive justice while also protecting the interests of Tennessee’s general 
public.  
III. Implementing a Case-By-Case Sentencing Model Specific to Juveniles 
 More drastic reform, rather than simply revising current codes, can be taken to fix this 
problem and potentially ensure the protection of juvenile offenders. Based on the available 
developmental science (e.g., Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg & Monahan, 2007) and data on 
rehabilitation (e.g., Gendreau, 1996; Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005), it would be an appropriate 
action to sentence juvenile offenders convicted of first-degree murder on a case-by-case basis in 
juvenile court. First, these offenders should remain in the juvenile justice system. It has been 
repeatedly documented that juvenile offenders, even violent offenders, appear to be more 
effectively rehabilitated when they are treated in the juvenile justice system (Izzo & Ross, 1990; 
Lambie & Randell, 2013; Lane et al., 2002). Second, each offender should be subjected to 
programming within these facilities that targets their developmentally-appropriate needs. For 
example, one offender may need intensive CBT intervention whereas another inmate may simply 
need access to educational opportunities. Last, each offender should remain in the juvenile 
detention center until they are 18- to 21-years-old. Upon their release, they should be subjected 
to parole and certain requirements based upon their individual needs and case. Only in 
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conjunction with the most extreme circumstances indicated by the recommendation of 
professionals working with them, such as psychiatrists and behavior specialists, should a juvenile 
offender be transferred to an adult prison to continue serving the minimum sentence. 
 Juvenile justice programs have been shown to be more effective for juvenile offenders 
because they do not focus solely on punishment, rather they implement rehabilitative strategies. 
Thus, keeping juvenile offenders in the juvenile justice system would maintain that juvenile 
offenders would be treated as a juvenile regardless of their crime and provide opportunities for 
rehabilitation. The goal with treating juvenile offenders should be rehabilitation and so that they 
can potentially become productive members of society. Treating these offenders on an 
individualized basis should be required to best treat the individual factors that led to the severe 
transgression and to prevent recidivism. This proposal requires effort by professional case 
workers working on an individual basis to determine what strategies should be used with each 
offender, such as therapies, access to education, and work-training programs.  
 This individualized effort would potentially allow those working with the offenders to 
determine when they should be released. If they are treated effectively in the juvenile detention 
centers, these offenders, in theory, should be eligible for release by their 21st birthday because 
they have had individualized care to promote their rehabilitation. However, this individualized 
attention would also allow professionals to determine if the offender is dangerous and should be 
detained longer, triggering the minimum sentence in the adult system.  
 The heart of this plan is to treat juvenile offenders as juveniles. The evidence suggests 
that developmentally-appropriate treatment specific to the offender should be required to 
facilitate rehabilitation and, subsequently, reduce recidivism, while protecting the offenders’ 
Constitutional rights. Implementing this plan in the state of Tennessee, as well as the revisions to 
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the transfer and sentencing codes, could appropriately incorporate relevant scientific evidence, 
while including Tennessee’s interest in protecting the public, and protecting the rights of the 
juvenile offenders involved.    
Conclusion 
 The evidence indicates there is a need for juvenile sentencing reform in Tennessee. 
Tennessee’s current practice of transferring juvenile offenders and sanctioning them as adults 
under the 51-to-life law appears to be unfair, unconstitutional, and unsupported by modern 
understandings of developmental science. As the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted in its Miller v. 
Alabama decision, when handling juvenile offenders, one must consider the unique mitigating 
qualities of youth. Tennessee’s current juvenile sentencing standards disregard these unique 
mitigating qualities. It is seemingly necessary for this state to incorporate the Supreme Court’s 
legal reasoning and today’s developmental science to reform its policies for sentencing juvenile 
offenders.  
 Tennessee should use this information to inform its reformation of multiple areas of 
juvenile sentencing practices. First, Tennessee should address its current transfer laws that 
automatically place certain juvenile offenders in adult court. This practice appears to undercut 
the Supreme Court’s ruling and disregards developmental science. Tennessee needs to 
restructure this law to recognize, due to these offenders’ immaturity, most juvenile offenders 
belong in a separated justice system from adult offenders. Tennessee’s transfer laws should also 
be practiced on a case-by-case basis that allows for the consideration of mitigating qualities of 
youth. Second, Tennessee should substantially reduce its current minimum sentencing standard 
for transferred juveniles convicted of first-degree murder from 51-years to a 15-years minimum 
sentencing standard. Reforming the 51-to-life law is necessary to recognize that juvenile 
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offenders can reform and should be given the opportunity to do so. Last, Tennessee needs to 
invest in targeted case-by-case sentencing that incorporates solutions to address the 
developmentally-appropriate needs of each juvenile offenders. With individualized attention, 
juvenile offenders may be effectively rehabilitated.  
The science suggests that juvenile offenders have a meaningful opportunity to be 
rehabilitated if they are in a detention center that promotes healthy development, such as the 
policies usually implemented in juvenile detention facilities. Tennessee has an opportunity to 
reform its current juvenile sentencing standards that effects the lives of hundreds of offenders. 
Reforming the current codes and implementing individualized sentencing can be an investment 
in the futures of these juvenile offenders to become conscientious citizens of Tennessee. Rather 
that continuing to rely on punitive strategies to mainly punish these offenders, Tennessee has the 
opportunity to help rehabilitate these people so that they can become productive members of 
society. Tennessee should stop viewing these offenders as dangerous predators and start 
recognizing that they are dealing with children who have the ability to reform and who deserve a 
second chance.   
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